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 In the Wake of Irregular Arrivals:




Th is article seeks to address the policies, practices, and con-
ditions of immigration detention in Canada. Th e article 
surveys detention worldwide, its promulgation in Canada, 
and changes ushered in via 2012 policy innovations. 
Focusing on mandatory detention and its relationship to 
the Designated Countries of Origin policy, the article also 
demonstrates the disproportionality of the Canadian gov-
ernment’s response to recent arrivals of people migrating 
by boat. Th e article emphasizes the dangers of establishing 
mandatory detention provisions and questions the justifi -
cations provided by defenders of the policies.
Résumé
Cet article examine les politiques, les pratiques et les condi-
tions de détention liée à l’immigration au Canada. Après 
un survol des diff érentes pratiques de détention dans le 
monde, on y examine son établissement au Canada ainsi 
que ses transformations dans le cours du renouvellement 
des politiques en 2012. En se concentrant sur la détention 
obligatoire et ses liens avec la politique des Pays d’origine 
désignés (POD), l’article nous démontre le caractère dis-
proportionné de la réponse du gouvernement canadien à 
l’arrivée récente d’immigrants par bateau. Cet article fait 
ressortir les dangers d’établir des dispositions de détention 
obligatoire, et remet en question les justifi cations dévelop-
pées par les tenants de ces politiques. 
Introduction 
In June 2009, minister of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism Jason Kenney told the House of Commons that “living conditions at detention centres are 
like those at a two-star hotel with a bit of security.”1 Kenney’s 
fl orid language was perhaps based on ignorance, or perhaps 
meant to mislead the press and the public at large over the 
conditions in detention. Either way, his comments obfuscated 
the reality of life inside a detention centre and downplayed 
the trauma of liberty deprivation based on non-citizenship 
status. Th is article seeks to correct such oversimplifi cations 
of detention practices and conditions in Canada. It aims to 
refocus attention on undoing the hysteria around people 
who migrate by boat. Th e article emphasizes the dangers of 
C-31, the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act (an 
amendment to IRPA)’s mandatory detention provisions and 
the transparency of justifi cations provided by Kenney and 
other defenders of the policy based on deterrence.
Th is article begins by examining how the Canadian gov-
ernment instrumentalized hysteria encircling a small num-
ber of boat arrivals to expand and accelerate its detention 
powers. C-31’s innovation of creating risk-based categoriza-
tions of large swaths of people through the creation of a list 
of Designated Countries of Origin (DCOs) is here high-
lighted in relation to mandatory detention. Aft er reviewing 
how Canadian detention policy typically plays out, the 
article notes a number of criticisms of the detention sys-
tem, including its eff ects on children and other vulnerable 
people. Th e article fi nds that the contradiction of mandatory 
detainees as being the most damaged by their experiences 
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in detention but also the most likely to be released into 
Canadian society make this policy a confusing and incoher-
ent course for Canada to be following.
Arrivals by Boat and the Advent of Mandatory 
Detention in Canada
The history of asylum seekers and migrants using boats to 
reach Canada’s shores is not long. In 1914, the government 
turned away more than 300 Sikh Indian nationals on board 
the Komagata Maru. When the ship eventually arrived back 
in Calcutta, 20 people were killed in a riot and others were 
detained and tortured. In 1939, 936 Jewish refugees were 
sent back to Europe after their ship, the SS St. Louis, was 
refused landing in Cuba, the United States, and eventually 
Canada. Many of the Jewish refugees were arrested upon 
landing and dispatched to death in concentration camps. 
While the Canadian government issued an informal apol-
ogy in 2008 for what happened with (to?) the Komagata 
Maru passengers, it has yet to issue an official apology for 
rejecting the SS St. Louis, save for a memorial to the Jewish 
refugees erected at Pier 21 in Halifax in 2011.
In the modern period, eight ships have arrived collect-
ively ferrying about 1,500 people: in 1986, 152 Tamils landed 
off the east coast of Newfoundland; in 1987, 174 Sikhs landed 
in Nova Scotia, prompting an emergency summer recall 
of Parliament; four ships carrying just under 600 Chinese 
migrants came to British Columbia’s coast in 1999; and the 
two most recent cases—MV Ocean Lady and MV Sun Sea—
which brought 575 Tamils to British Columbia in October 
2009 and August 2010, respectively. Cumulatively, these 
eight vessels have conveyed 0.2 per cent of total refugee 
arrivals in Canada over the past 25 years.2
C-31’s Mandatory Detention Provision
Canadian detention centres house a variety of de facto 
mandatory detainees. These people include migrants pos-
ing flight or security risks or who have not proven their 
identities and who could not find sureties in Canada; post-
sentence, pre-removal offenders transferred directly to 
prison to await deportation; nationals from DCOs or other 
migrants with “manifestly unfounded” cases put on a “fast-
track” process; and Security Certificate detainees. There are 
also people who are legally or effectively stateless, such as 
Baha’i practitioners from Iran and Palestinians in the first 
category, and North Korean and Somali nationals in the 
second. Yet it was partially in response to the recent land-
ings of the MV Ocean Lady and MV Sun Sea, and partially 
to complement its deterrence of unwanted migration agenda, 
that the Canadian government moved to formalize its use 
of mandatory immigration detention. C-31, the Protecting 
Canada’s Immigration System Act (an amendment to IRPA), 
was introduced in February 2012 and eventually passed that 
December.
Under C-31, the minister of public safety may designate 
two or more foreign nationals as a group of “irregular arriv-
als” on the basis that they cannot be examined in a timely 
manner or on suspicions of “smuggling.” Such groups are 
given a two-week review of refugee admissibility. If the 
Designated Foreign Nationals (DFN) classification goes 
through, the group is liable for a one-year period of deten-
tion for all persons aged 16 or older; the minister will use 
discretionary power to decide whether to detain children 
under 16 or to forcibly separate them from accompanying 
parents for one year. The 9 May 2012 amendments to Bill 
C-31 introduced the possibility of conducting a review every 
180 days.
DFN stigmatization continues after release from deten-
tion. Even if the Immigration and Refugee Board finds that 
they are persons in need of protection, there is a five-year 
bar on DFNs applying for permanent residence. DFNs face 
several consequences as a result of their designation during 
this five-year period: prohibition from family reunification; 
requirements to report regularly to immigration authorities 
for questioning and to produce unspecified documents on 
demand; and a ban from travelling outside Canada for any 
reason.3
Within six months of its becoming legislation, the minis-
ter of public safety has used the “irregular arrivals” designa-
tion once, in relation to a group of Romanian asylum seekers 
in December 2012. This group opted to return to Romania 
rather than press their cases to stay in Canada and endure 
the year in detention.
The Designated Countries of Origin List
After repeatedly imploring the overloading of the refugee 
determination system by “bogus claimants” and “fraud-
sters,” particularly in relation to the Hungarian Roma or 
those fleeing the violence in Mexico, the government intro-
duced the concept of Designated Countries of Origin into 
Canadian legislation through C-31. DCOs are presumed 
to be “safe” countries that “do not normally produce refu-
gees, have a robust human rights record and offer strong 
state protection.”4 The minister of citizenship, immigration 
and multiculturalism designates countries as DCOs on the 
basis of quantitative factors (a rejection rate of at least 75 
per cent (including withdrawn and abandoned cases), or a 
withdrawn and abandoned rate of at least 60 per cent), or on 
the basis of the minister’s opinion that the country exhibits 
the hallmarks of a refugee-protecting country, including an 
independent judiciary, enjoyment of democratic rights, etc.5
How does a refugee claimant from a DCO apply for pro-
tection in Canada? The Canadian government expects to 
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hold hearings on refugee claims of DCO nationals within 
30–45 days after referral of the claim to the IRB, as opposed 
to the 60-day timeframe for other refugee claimants. Unlike 
regularly streamed claimants, failed DCO claimants will 
neither have access to the Refugee Appeal Division nor 
be permitted to apply for a work permit upon arrival in 
Canada.6 Legal aid reductions announced by the Canadian 
government in April 2013 mean that asylum claimants in 
Ontario who originate from any of the DCO safe countries 
may no longer be entitled to legal aid and representation at 
their hearings.7 Of course, a DCO claimant is not an auto-
matic candidate for detention, but certain situations pre-
dispose such claimants to the possibility. In any event, the 
creation of a DCO list in C-31 and the new timelines make it 
“very difficult to file a claim” and ensure that “certain groups 
of asylum seekers will be excluded from the system and 
returned to their countries of origin.”8
The original December 2012 list of 25 DCOs had been 
expanded to 37 countries as of June 2013. Included in this 
list are the United States, Mexico, and most countries in the 
European Union. Some of the choices of DCOs have been 
met with outcry from the legal and advocacy communities. 
The addition of Hungary to the list has been particularly pro-
tested. At a press conference on 14 December 2012, Minister 
Kenney defended this choice by arguing that “95% of claims 
in 2011 were fraudulent. They were either abandoned, with-
drawn, or refused.” The Canadian Association of Refugee 
Lawyers disputes this claim, suggesting instead that the 95 
per cent number ignores both the fact that almost 3,000 of 
the 4,400 claims (68 per cent) had not been decided at the 
time of the press conference, and also the 18 per cent rate of 
acceptance for Hungarian claims heard at the IRB. Indeed, 
the mounting evidence that Hungary is not able to provide 
protection for vulnerable people from racist and anti-Sem-
itic attacks within its borders9 leads some refugee advocates 
to believe that the addition of Hungary to the DCO list was 
a specious effort to curb the influx of Roma into Canada.10
The level of discretionary decision-making afforded to the 
Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism 
in crafting the DCO list is high. As mentioned, the min-
ister sets both the quantitative and qualitative standards 
for inclusion. There is no public conversation to debate and 
justify the percentage of rejected cases or transparency of 
the judiciary that lead to a country being found not to pro-
duce refugees. Also worrying is the fact that the minister 
can add more countries to the DCO list at any time, also 
without public consultation. More generally, as Petra Diop 
points out, the DCO policy is “profoundly reductionist and 
allows for entire groups of refugee claimants to be labeled as 
‘frauds’ on the basis of hailing from a Designated Country 
of Origin.”11
Conditions in Immigration Detention Centres
International law generally permits the detention of migrants, 
pending admissions or deportations, and considers it to be 
administrative, non-punitive, and ancillary to immigra-
tion control.12 It is understood as a second-best product of 
immigration enforcement meant to safeguard other aspects 
of control, including deportation. International law sets 
limits on detention according to principles of proportional-
ity, due diligence, and non-arbitrariness.13 Detention should 
be used thoughtfully and as a last resort.14 Individualized 
assessments should take into account the individual’s per-
sonal history and risk of absconding before a detention 
decision is made. The detention of vulnerable people—
including unaccompanied elderly persons, survivors of tor-
ture or trauma, persons with mental or physical disabilities, 
pregnant or nursing women, and minors—should be espe-
cially avoided. Before resorting to detention, states must 
ensure that a range of alternative, less restrictive, non-cus-
todial measures are available; they must also demonstrate 
that these so-called alternatives to detention programs will 
not be effective.15 It is unclear how these issues of concern 
can be addressed in the context of a mandatory detention 
provision.
Discretionary detention policy in Canada is targeted pri-
marily at three groups of people: (1) “irregular migrants,” 
or foreigners who have been found by a proper procedure 
to have either entered illegally without having had a pre-
authorized visa or who are otherwise by law obliged to 
depart; (2) asylum seekers prior to a final decision on their 
claims to protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 
(Geneva Convention); and (3) asylum seekers whose applica-
tions for Geneva Convention protection have been rejected 
by the destination state.16 The majority may be paroled or 
released on bond, but some are required to remain in deten-
tion until a decision can be reached on removal. This lat-
ter group is effectively subject to indefinite detention, and 
the “unknowingness” of this open-ended detention without 
time limits can present difficulties akin to mental torture.17
Detention is a civil procedure. Nevertheless, it often 
(intentionally) resembles criminal incarceration. Dora 
Schriro acknowledged as much in a report released shortly 
before the completion of her tenure as director of the Office 
of Detention Policy and Planning in the United States:
As a matter of law, Immigration Detention is unlike Criminal 
Incarceration. Yet Immigration Detention and Criminal Incar-
ceration detainees tend to be seen by the public as comparable, and 
both confined populations are typically managed in similar ways. 
Each group is ordinarily detained in secure facilities with hard-
ened perimeters in remote locations at considerable distances from 
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counsel and/or their communities. With only a few exceptions, 
[detention] facilities … were originally built, and currently oper-
ate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and sentenced felons. 
Their design, construction, staffing plans, and population manage-
ment strategies are based largely upon the principles of command 
and control. Likewise, [the United States] adopted standards that 
are based upon corrections law and promulgated by correctional 
organizations to guide the operation of jails and prisons.18
In his 2008 report to the UN Human Rights Council, the UN 
special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants observed 
the escalation of what is referred to in the academic context 
as a “crimmigration crisis.”19 The special rapporteur specif-
ically cited detention as evidence of this trend: “It is import-
ant that irregular migration be seen as an administrative 
offence and irregular migrants processes on an individual 
basis. Where possible, detention should be used only as a 
last resort and in general irregular migrants should not be 
treated as criminals. The often erratic and unlawful deten-
tion of migrants is contributing to the broader phenomenon 
of the criminalization of irregular migration.”20
Detention centres throughout the Western world are 
characterized by conditions that jeopardize the dignity of 
detainees. Common problems include inadequate medical, 
psychological, and hygienic care; subcontracting of servi-
ces to ill-equipped private firms; and guard misconduct.21 
Significantly, attention is rarely paid to rectifying the men-
tal debilitation wrought by stays in immigration detention 
centres. Psychological distress indictors amongst detainees 
include “depression, suicidal ideation, posttraumatic stress, 
anxiety, panic, and physical symptoms,” particularly when 
“compared with compatriot asylum seekers, refugees, and 
immigrants living in the community.”22
There is a growing body of research and media reports 
concluding that long-term detention has adverse mental 
health outcomes for detainees.23 Time in detention is posi-
tively associated with severity of the detainee’s distress and 
a persistent negative impact on mental health after release.24 
This finding is particularly important in states such as 
Canada that do not have official maximum time limits pre-
scribed by law. This finding should be further contextual-
ized against the background of some states reporting that 
the majority of successful deportations are effected in the 
first weeks and months of detention; the longer detention 
lasts, the less likely the outcome will be deportation, the pre-
sumed chief purpose of detention.25 Therefore, mandatory 
detainees are also probable candidates for eventual release 
into the community, a confusing and seemingly incoherent 
effect of the policy interacting with real world constraints.
Neglect or abuse by medical and other profession-
als employed in detention centres can lead to distressing 
situations and even death. For example, the guards, doc-
tors, and nurses who encountered Czech asylum seeker Jan 
Szamko at the Toronto immigration holding centre in 2011 
did not detect that his odd behaviour was due to a lethal 
fluid buildup that compressed his heart, lowered his blood 
pressure, and subsequently shut down his bodily functions. 
On 8 December 2011, Szamko became the first immigration 
detainee to die in a Canadian facility.26 After accounting for 
former detainees who die after release from detention, the 
number of deaths caused by detention would continue to 
climb.27
The Canadian Immigration Detention System
Upon contextualization within a worldwide comparison of 
detention regimes, Canada can be seen to be shifting from a 
relatively progressive, holistic approach to a more typically 
draconian, punitive one. The legislative grounds for immi-
gration detention in Canada can be found in sections 54 to 
61 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), 
and in sections 244 to 250 of the Immigration Refugee and 
Protection Regulations (IRPR). The Immigration Refugee 
and Protection Regulations as well as the Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada Policy Manual on Detention pro-
vide directions on how immigration detention is to be 
enacted. A member of the Immigration Division (ID) of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) reviews detention 
after 48 hours, then within the next 7 days, and then every 
subsequent period of 30 days. While the IRB oversees deten-
tion reviews and rules on appeals, the Canadian Border 
Services Agency is the detaining authority that is respon-
sible for ports of entry and enforcing the IRPA.
There are three immigration holding centres (IHCs) in 
Canada: Toronto IHC with a capacity of 125 beds; Laval 
(Quebec) IHC with a capacity of 150 beds; and British 
Columbia IHC at the Vancouver International Airport with 
a capacity of 24 beds (although this third facility detains 
people only for up to 72 hours). So-called low-risk detain-
ees are held in IHCs and high-risk detainees—people with 
criminal backgrounds, potential for flight risk, and/or 
mental health or behavioural problems—are held in prov-
incial correctional or remand facilities not operated by the 
Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA). Private security 
companies provide the guards that staff the Canadian IHCs. 
The CBSA claims that 74 per cent of detainees, which in 
some cases include children, are released within 48 hours.28
The Canadian immigration detention system is finan-
cially costly. In fiscal year 2008–9, detention and removal 
programs cost approximately $92 million, of which deten-
tion costs amounted to $45.7 million, or an average of $3,185 
per detained case. In 2008–09, the cost to Canadian tax-
payers of detaining one person for one day in non-CBSA 
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provincial facilities ranged from $120 to $207.29 The cost 
now stands at around $239 per person per day.30
What happens to refugee claimants, children, and vul-
nerable people who become subject to detention in Canada? 
A small percentage of refugee claimants are detained on 
arrival. As a rule, children and youth (minors under 18 years 
of age) should not be held in immigration detention; if they 
are detained, it should be as a measure of last resort. Section 
60 of the IRPA affirms “as a principle that a minor child 
shall be detained only as a measure of last resort, taking into 
account the other applicable grounds and criteria including 
the best interests of the child.”31 In those exceptional cases 
where they are detained, international law requires govern-
ments to hold children in facilities and conditions appropri-
ate to their age.32 Nonetheless, children are detained even 
when they are not security risks or dangers to the public. In 
2008, an average of 77 children per month were detained, 
with the monthly average dropping to 31 in the first six 
months of 2009.33 Some children may be detained as “guests” 
or because they are “accompanying their detained parent.” 
These children are not included in the official statistical rec-
ord and so the true number of detained children is higher 
than the official one cited above.
As regards vulnerable people, there is no systematic 
screening to identify them in the Canadian detention estate, 
and CBSA facilities do not offer any type of counselling 
services.34 If detainees are identified as exhibiting certain 
behavioural problems—such as aggressiveness—or mental 
illness—such as suicidal tendencies—then they are often 
transferred to prisons. For example, male asylum seekers 
in Ontario who exhibit behavioural or mental health prob-
lems are usually transferred to Central East Correctional 
Centre (the “Lindsay Super jail”) if it is for a long period 
of time, and to the Toronto West Detention Centre, if it is 
for a shorter period of time or they have suicidal tenden-
cies.35 There is a related concern that immigration detain-
ees are co-mingling with criminal inmates, and that two-
tiered mental health care is being provided in prisons with 
Canadian-born people being prioritized over newcomers.36
The Far-Flung Locations of Detention Centres
Since the IHCs are relatively small in capacity, dispersal 
amongst facilities is often the only strategy available when 
a large-scale detention order is made or when a large group 
of new arrivals is detained. For example, after the arrival 
of the MV Sun Sea, nearly 200 male passengers and crew 
were housed in a makeshift detention area set up in the yard 
of the Fraser Regional Correctional Centre; women went to 
the Alouette Correctional Centre, and those with children 
went to the Burnaby Youth Custody Services Centre. These 
facilities are located in the district of Maple Ridge, over 40 
kilometres away from Vancouver.
The paucity of detention space in Canada raises a related 
concern: the unfairness of the chance of detention being 
highly correlated to whether the migrant or asylum seeker 
is arrested in Toronto and Montreal versus anywhere else in 
the state. The Canadian Council for Refugees notes, “Asylum 
seekers in Toronto and Montreal appear to be more readily 
detained than asylum seekers in other areas, because of the 
convenient availability of a detention centre. Furthermore, 
there are indications that in those cities the decision to 
detain or not detain is significantly influenced by how full 
the detention centre is and whether there is money in the 
detention budget or not.”37 If true, this scenario amounts to 
an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, a contravention of inter-
national legal rules on practising detention.
Although the IHCs are located close to the top three des-
tination cities for migrants coming to Canada, the provincial 
jails are more difficult to get to without a car. The far-flung 
locations of the jails complicate the abilities of detainees’ 
networks to visit and to provide support. Compounding 
these issues of access are centres’ limited hours of visita-
tion, detainees’ difficulties gathering case-relevant evidence 
from detention, and the growing use of videoconference 
technology that allows for an immigration judge (and inter-
preter) in one courtroom to hear the case of an immigra-
tion detainee located in another courtroom some distance 
away. Cultural and linguistic barriers also compromise the 
abilities of some detainees to proceed fruitfully through 
their asylum and immigration adjudication procedures.38 
Further, the mobility of detainees among the IHCs and the 
jails may also have an ancillary effect of presenting them as 
more transient and fleeting to actors that have an influence 
over their experiences, thereby leading to a reduction in 
care from figures such as guards, managers, and case work-
ers.39 The difficulties of the conditions in provincial jails are 
multiplied in the context of mandatory detention: the typ-
ically long periods of detention spent in a space of relative 
isolation but hyper-exposure to guards, fellow detainees, 
and insecurity can lead to long-term mental and physical 
health consequences, a situation that is particularly egre-
gious in light of the fate of release into the community that 
awaits many of the people subject to mandatory detention.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Although it has been used only once as of June 2014, the 
power of the C-31 “irregular arrivals” designation should 
not be underestimated. The designation signals a growth in 
reasons or justifications for mandatory detention in Canada. 
If recent legal challenges fail and C-31’s detention of asylum 
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seekers on the basis of their means of arrival is normalized 
into everyday Canadian immigration policy, the designa-
tion will work hand-in-hand with the DCO policy to cre-
ate a system of more distrust and less protection for all new 
arrivals. The level of discretion in deciding the entries on 
the DCO list is out of proportion with the consequences for 
migrants from those countries. In light of the grave con-
cerns highlighted by the public outcry over the DCO list, 
the minister of citizenship, immigration and multicultural-
ism should initiate a more robust conversation to justify the 
choices of countries included on the list and to validate the 
high level of public trust accorded to the minister via the 
discretionary decision-making powers.
Immigration detention systems expose an already vul-
nerable population to a potentially devastating situation in 
which their mental and physical health undoubtedly deteri-
orates. Instead of seeking measures to alleviate this burden, 
the Canadian government is using C-31 and other policy 
tools that effectively worsen it. Long-term detainees are 
both more psychologically and physically damaged from 
their experiences in IHCs and provincial jails, and more 
likely to remain in Canada after release. The policy of man-
datorily detaining certain groups of non-citizens who are 
then expected to integrate and assimilate into Canadian 
society appears to be somewhat incoherent. Indeed, C-31 
and the DCO policy are examples of a policy objective being 
effectively stymied by practical constraints, and the result 
may turn out to be antithetical to the original motivation for 
implementing the legislation.
It is also important to recognize that the damage from 
detention is not limited to those persons who are incarcer-
ated: there is a ripple effect out from the IHCs and jails into 
the wider community, touching the detainee’s networks but 
also ordinary residents who form negative impressions of 
detainees as criminals, deviants, and worse.40 Xenophobia 
and prejudice directed at detainees—including but not to 
those hailing from a DCO—can loop back to feed in to 
the sorts of moral panics that turned the arrivals of eight 
ships over a period of 14 years into an apparently acceptable 
justification for mandatory detention for one year. Scholars 
are observing a growing cohort of developed states that are 
calling on and exploiting their detention systems to amplify 
minor events into full-blown crises, thus rendering mas-
sive changes to immigration and asylum policies virtually 
indisputable in the public domain.41 In the wake of these 
eight ships and the subsequent creation of a DCO list and 
draconian detention provisions, it is possible that Canada 
should be added to this dubious group. The implications of 
this turn for the larger Canadian democratic polity should 
provide an interesting topic of research in another article.
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